4.11.2013

The Sleepwalkers, Clark - A*

                                         In the introduction to this extraordinary book, which is sub-titled 'How Europe Went To War In 1914', the author cites a historian who said, "it was the first calamity of the twentieth century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang". Indeed, the seventy-five  years after 1914 saw the calamities of unspeakable war, an absurd peace, revolution and Depression, another war - even more horrid, totalitarianism and Cold War.  As the  war itself was an appalling slaughter of a generation and four years bereft of civilian or military competence, the run-up to it has garnered the attention of generations of historians.  Barbara Tuchman's 'Guns of August', which won a Pulitzer and which I read as a high school freshman fifty years ago, was my introduction to both grown-up history and this topic.  Somewhere along the way, either through the standard teaching of American history or after reading a biography of the oddly flamboyant, irksome Kaiser, I came to the popular conclusion that it really was the fault of the Germans.  Although Clark says there is no smoking gun and  "the outbreak of the war was a tragedy, not a crime", he tells a tale where there are quite a few culprits queuing up in front of the Germans.
                                       The book is detailed and complex.  There is much more here than Sarajevo, the dual alliance, the triple entente, mobilization and war. There are many moving parts and the author keeps coming back to the imperial rivalry between Russia and England.  The Russians had been expanding for centuries; they were pushing in the Far East, where England had allied with Japan, as a counter-balance.  The Great Game threatened English hegemony on the Indian sub-continent; Russia threatened English interests in the Mid-East by pushing into Persia. Most importantly, the Russians wanted Constantinople, an assured passage through the Bosporus and access to the Mediterranean, a threat to the English imperial lifeline, the Suez Canal.                                                    
                                       The decay of the Ottoman Empire is the source of immeasurable tension.  Its slow-motion collapse, which led to the creation of  Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia in the 19th century,  is the reason for the first two Balkan Wars, wherein the above four countries fight the Turks and then everyone turns on Bulgaria, because they won too much territory.  Toss in the Italians invading Libya, the creation of Albania, Serb ambitions for all of Serbdom and Montenegrin nationalism and you have an incendiary mess in and around the Balkans.  Why anyone would fight for these craggy mountainous hellholes is beyond me. As Bismarck said "they weren't worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier".
                                       Serbia comes off as a backward, impoverished, ignorant, violent country of thugs with a chip on its shoulder and ambitions well above its skill level.  There is a great deal of material on how and why the Russians back their "little brothers", as they were wont to tab their fellow Slav coreligionists. It is a policy rather than a strategy and one that makes no sense to the author. The Serbian government knew about the plans of the Black Hand and the Russians had actually contributed funding.  The assassinations on  June 28th created righteous indignation in Vienna.  The Serbs were happy about what happened and did nothing to appease Austrian concerns or help investigate the murders. The Russians took the position that the Serbs had nothing to do with it and viewed it as an internal Austrian matter.  The Austrians wished for a punitive war, but were incapable of quickly launching one and were waiting for some sort of approval from Berlin.
                                      The Treaty system was not as black and white as it is perhaps often presented. Indeed the so called Triple-Entente was scheduled to lapse the following year. Britain had a tremendous amount of flexibility in its accord to aid France and had no direct obligation to Russia. The Brits had actually been exploring options with the Germans. Germany and Austria did not have a coordinated policy either before the assassinations  or in July. No one expected that the events at Sarajevo would trigger a continental war. A month later, Serbia rejected the Austrian ultimatum because the Tsar and his ministers told them to. The French President, an ardent Germanophobe, who happened to be in St. Petersburg, signaled his assent to war. Russia wanted a go at Austria, felt confident and started a partial mobilization on July 25. On the 28th, Austria declared war on Serbia. Russia mobilized on the 30th, a day late, because Nicky got cold feet after a telegram from Willy. Germany declared war on the 1st, but Wilhelm held his troops at the border, while he tried to get in touch with George V. The British Cabinet only had a minority ready to vote to fight, but somehow the desire to tether themselves to the Russians, contain Germany and defer the implementation of recently approved Irish Home Rule led to an August 4th declaration.  What a mess!


1 comment:

  1. Anonymous5:32 PM

    First time that I have seen an 'A' rating by you. I have definitely placed on my list for the future. Wendell

    ReplyDelete