This is a continuation of the March 6th blog on the first portion of this book.
Lawrence arrived at Faisal's camp in December 1916. Now dressed in the white robes of a sheikh at his host's suggestion, he took up residence among the Arabs. In January, when Lawrence's position as liaison was made permanent at Faisal's request, he knew he was now in a position to "remake the war in Arabia in his own image." Some in Cairo wanted to see Aqaba—a port strategically placed at the northern end of the Red Sea's eastern prong—taken from the sea in an amphibious landing. Had they succeeded, the Allies could have prevented the Arabs from attacking the Hejaz Railway and advancing into Syria. Lawrence took a very dangerous step and informed Faisal of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, in which the Allies agreed to divide the Middle East and exclude the Arabs from a meaningful role. Lawrence and Faisal began to plan an attack to the north, inland and away from Allied interference. Lawrence came to understand that the road to Arab success lay in using the vast desert and its mountainous terrain to their advantage, prosecuting a guerrilla war. He also began to see the advantages of approaching Aqaba from the desert and occupying the city before the Allies arrived from the sea.
In the spring of 1917, Lawrence met Auda, chief of the Howeitat. He was a formidable desert warrior, and Lawrence realized that with Auda he could take Aqaba. The fact that his superior officer indicated that Britain did not wish the Arabs to take the city gave Lawrence pause, but did not stop him. At this point, knowing full well the treachery the Allies intended, Lawrence resolved to lead an Arab revolt into Syria and attempt to thwart both Britain and France. While he and Auda rode east and fought a handful of hard-fought skirmishes along the way, he also orchestrated the Arab uprising in southern Syria. The Turks surrendered Aqaba on July 6, 1917. Knowing supplies were desperately needed, Lawrence rode 150 miles to the Suez Canal to notify Cairo immediately.
Lawrence was hailed as a conquering hero, nominated for the Victoria Cross, made a Commander of the Order of the Bath, and promoted to major. He convinced the new commander, General Allenby, to support his thrust north into Syria, coordinated with a British army attack through Palestine. Working with Allenby would prove a challenge. When Allenby explained his tactical plan, the only thing Lawrence could think about was a small raid on a railway bridge. Meanwhile, his Arabs sat in Aqaba, growing restless while waiting for a chance to attack Syria. Allenby's campaign into Palestine succeeded, while Lawrence's efforts did not. He sent a messenger to Hussein in Aqaba telling him to come north. On his way west, he was captured and likely raped and tortured by a Turkish commander. His accounts over the years were inconsistent, leaving uncertainty about what exactly happened. His colleagues, however, were convinced that he became more remote and increasingly ruthless in his pursuit of revenge against the enemy.
Late in 1917, Arab enthusiasm for Britain's efforts in the region began to fade. There was growing disillusionment over the Balfour Declaration*, and the Turks made public the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.
In January, on his way to meet Allenby, Lawrence led the defense of a small town under Turkish attack. He managed it so effectively that he was awarded the DSO, having inflicted casualties—killed, wounded, or captured—at ten times his own losses. He was promoted to colonel. That spring, both Allenby's offensive and an Arab attack in the desert failed. To make matters worse, Britain recalled thousands of Allenby's troops to reinforce the BEF in France, forcing him into a defensive posture. When Lawrence learned that Allenby was dissolving his camel corps, he requested—and received—its camels. With that added mobility, the Arabs would be able to attack Syria without British assistance.
Soon, however, Allenby received a substantial number of Indian troops and resumed the offensive. He tasked Lawrence and the Arabs with destroying the railways around Deraa to isolate the Turks from reinforcements and supplies. They achieved all their objectives, and Lawrence was particularly proud of having destroyed his seventy-ninth bridge. Allenby's offensive was a complete success, and if the railways around Deraa remained severed, Turkish forces would be encircled. The British repeatedly instructed Lawrence that under no circumstances were the Arabs to reach Damascus first. The Arabs rendered the railways unusable. Allenby then reversed course and allowed the Arabs to take Damascus. Lawrence and Faisal entered the famed city, where Lawrence appointed an Arab governor and briefly held authority.
On October 3, Allenby, Faisal, and their staffs met, with Lawrence serving as interpreter. Following instructions from London, Allenby told Faisal to recognize French guidance, as Syria was to become a French protectorate. Faisal walked out. The next day, Lawrence requested leave and returned to England.
"Everything that T. E. Lawrence had fought for, schemed for, and arguably betrayed his country for turned to ashes in a single five-minute conversation between Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau." They met in London on December 1, agreeing that Britain would control Palestine and Iraq, while France would take Syria, finalizing their arrangement before Wilson's arrival. When it was over, Lawrence fell into "a state of extreme depression and nervous exhaustion." The region continued in its fractious ways: the French exiled Faisal, and ibn- Saud was consolidating power in the desert. Churchill, appointed Colonial Secretary in 1920, sought Lawrence's help. Together they crafted what appeared to be a sensible settlement at the Cairo Conference, bringing a measure of stability to the region.
Lawrence's only desire thereafter was to disappear. In 1922, he enlisted in the RAF under an assumed name. In retrospect, it is clear that he suffered from PTSD during these years. He retired in 1935, and on the morning of May 13 he crashed his motorcycle. He died on the 19th at the age of 46. Churchill delivered the eulogy.
As indicated in March, this book has been a struggle for me. It was a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award in 2013, but it does tend to wander. To underscore that point, four additional narratives run alongside Lawrence's: a German diplomat and soldier - Major Curt Prüfer; a Turkish governor - Djemal Pasha; a Jewish Palestinian agronomist and spy - Aaron Aaronsohn; and an American oilman - William Yale. Their stories are important, and reading them carefully is worthwhile. However, I found it difficult to weave five parallel narratives together and chose instead to focus on the principal one. The events of a century ago are extraordinarily complex. Despite my criticisms, I have learned a great deal and gained a deeper appreciation for the intricate dynamics of the Middle East.
Lawrence remains one of the most fascinating, enigmatic, brave, and perceptive military figures of all time—though he would likely have described himself as a civilian temporarily in uniform. Guerrilla wars are typically led by charismatic local figures rebelling against superior forces. In this case, he led the Arabs against his own country. He committed what could be considered treason and was later offered a knighthood, which he declined upon understanding the circumstances behind the invitation to Buckingham Palace—all before the age of thirty. He shattered every mold.
*In 1918, Lawrence presciently observed, "If a Jewish state is to be created in Palestine, it will have to be done by force of arms and maintained by force of arms amid an overwhelmingly hostile population." He was also perceptive enough to see through Chaim Weizmann's reassurances to the Arabs about coexistence. In a report, he noted, "Dr. Weizmann hopes for a completely Jewish Palestine in fifty years."