10.07.2014

Command And Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety - Schlosser - B +

                                             This intriguing book was a Pulitzer Prize finalist a year ago. It tells two stories in alternating chapters. The first story is about how close we came to a nuclear accident in Arkansas in 1980.  There were 18 Titan-II silos in a semi-circle about an hour north and west of Little Rock.  On Sept 18, 1980, near the town of Damascus, a technician dropped a socket that somehow smashed a hole in a stage 1 fuel tank and a slow leak began. The propellant leak was followed by a series of cascading failures leading to more leaks, falling and rising pressures in different tanks, and the release of 100,000 gallons of water into the silo.  "Flashing red lights on the control center warned there was a fuel leak, an oxidizer leak, a fire in the silo - three things that couldn't be happening at once." About 7 hours after the initial error, the first stage of the rocket  blew up, scattered the silo and the 180,000 pound blast doors over about half-a-mile and then the rocket rose a thousand feet into the air before the second stage blew up.  Although there was a night-to-day explosion, it was not the nuclear core, which was  defused the next day. One technician died and a few more were injured. Amazingly, the Air Force denied there was a warhead, refused to tell the local authorities anything (even declining to provide medical information to help their own men) and eventually punished most of the people at the site. A year later, the aged Titan II's were decommissioned, a decade after they had become obsolete.
                                             The second story is the more familiar one of the atomic and then nuclear programs from Einstein's letter through the entire Manhattan project and into the post-war era.  Reading about the fifties is always fascinating. We had unlimited resources and unceasingly deployed them. Planes, more planes, bombs and bigger bombs, rockets, early warning radar systems and extensive management commands were nothing the American military budget couldn't handle. I've always admired Ike's loathing of war and his constant rejection of the military's desire to strike first at the Soviets. But, more than anything else, I remain amazed at those who thought nuclear war winnable or survivable.  We should never forget that much of the massive build-up was pure politics and pure fear. We were always ahead of the Soviets. The one time they trumped us was in the late fifties when they deployed Sputnik because they had the rocket delivery system to propel massive weights into outer space. We did not have an early warning system for rockets, so the military came up with a 'Dr. Strangelove' system to advise the President if we had been hit. They placed thousands of radiation and flash  sensors on buildings around the country, wired into some rudimentary computer system and capable of presenting Ike with a visual pattern of the hits. How bloody useless that would be appeared not to have been considered. And, any reading of the era is never complete without total wonder at SAC's Curtis LeMay. He clearly was one heck of an organizational genius, a WW2 hero, but frightfully zealous in his belief in nuclear weapons. With half-lives of 24,000 years and hundreds of millions of years for plutonium and uranium respectively, one can only wonder what a post-apocalyptic world would look like.    Inter-service rivalries, i.e. the Army and Navy seeking to stop the Air Force's near monopoly of weapons, led to two of my favorite lunacies - the atomic land mine and the hand-held atomic rifle.
                                          For me, the Damascus story was the more interesting of the two.  I've read both of Richard Rhode's books and recently read a book called '15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation'.  Thus, the general background material was somewhat repetitive. If someone hasn't read all of those, this is a great and relatively brief primer on the topic.

No comments:

Post a Comment