Gall is a NY Times reporter, the daughter of a British journalist, who covered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a lifelong supporter of the Afghanis. It is my belief, after over forty years of reading books by Times reporters, that they write the best first drafts of history (see Karnow, Halbertsam, Sheehan, Friedman etc.) Gall makes it clear in the prologue - and this is no surprise to anyone - that it is Pakistan that has taken our money, played a nefarious game, supported Islamic terrorism and is the "right" enemy. We ventured into the 'graveyard of empires' just after 9/11, as the Taliban had sheltered and nurtured Al Qaeda. Within two months, both were vanquished. Many moved to Pakistan, where they prospered, particularly after a Pakistan election in 2002 empowered the religious right. Due to Pakistan's historic strategic interest in controlling Afghanistan and shared tribal (Pashtun) connections, the north-west provinces of Pakistan became a staging area for the Taliban's eventual return home. Both the military and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) paid lip service to America's interests, while supporting the Taliban. The Taliban resurgence in southern Afghanistan was met with a NATO response that kept them at bay but began to alienate the countryside. Errors leading to civilian casualties in the air war caused endless distress. As the Taliban strengthened in Afghanistan, they exerted their power back across the border in the tribal areas, virtually replacing the Pakistan government. The Karzai led government and NATO could not staunch the Taliban in Afghanistan. A resurgent Taliban was ready to capture Kandahar by 2010, leading to Obama's surge of an additional 33,000 US troops. Once again, the Taliban were routed. The author feels that the Taliban, Pakistan's proxies, are down but not out. She feels that with the US and NATO leaving, they will reprise their success in Afghanistan. She is of the school that says we are leaving too early.
As good as this first draft is, it lacks perspective and background. It never really explains the 'whys' behind the success of the Taliban. They overcame the mujahideen, who had worn out the Soviets, but there is scant information to explain how they wound up governing the country. The US's strategic plan is also skipped over. Perhaps we didn't have one. We went to defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. Why did we stay after they were defeated in 2001-2? I'm not sure I remember and there's no elaboration here. Indeed, the author sort of flash-forwards half a dozen years at one point. Of perhaps greatest importance, why did we funnel over $25B to Pakistan to be our ally in the GWOT? What has that accomplished? Gall points out in closing that Pakistan is a major exporter of terror. The British, I believe, tried to invade Afghanistan and could not. The Soviets were embroiled there for a decade and failed. We have been there for almost a decade and a half. The sobriquet 'graveyard of empires' seems appropriate to me.
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