Dominic Lieven is a noted British historian, whose grandfather, Prince Lieven, Chief of the Russian Naval General Staff, makes a brief appearance here. In his mid-60's, Lieven states that this, his sixth book on Russia, is his last. He writes that he will present an interpretation of the run-up to the war that is unfamiliar to the Anglophone world and one in which Ukraine is a key consideration. It is intended to be three books: one about Russia's descent into the war, one an interpretation of the war from Russia's perspective and lastly, an introduction to the Revolution. "A key premise of this book is that World War I was the source and origin of most of the catastrophes that subsequently afflicted twentieth-century Russia. " What followed were revolution, civil war, two famines, collectivization, dictatorship, terror, international instability and a combined death count of fifty million in Russia and the USSR between 1914 and 1945.
The dawn of the twentieth century saw all of the world's great empires, British, American, French, German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian, focused on one thing - preservation and survival. One part of that process was emphasizing nationalism at home in order to hold the core in place. However, in the Russian Empire, 19th-century nationalism caused worries in Petersburg, and the stirrings of Ukrainian nationalism were the most feared. Ukraine was historically the home of the Russian church and the place where the state began. It was home to the majority of the Empire's industry and key agricultural foodstuffs. It had its own language and its elites were feeling the stirrings of nationalism. The future of the empire was further complicated by Nicholas II's foreign policies. "Russia in 1905 provides a classic case of the interaction of imperialism, war, and revolution in a Second World Country. Petersburg had embarked on an expansionist policy that it could not back with adequate resources. Humiliation in the pursuit of imperial glory led to revolution at home." The author then spends almost half of the book detailing the incredibly complex foreign policy issues of the Empire in the decade after 1905. Although desperately aware that they needed to avoid war for financial, social, and military reasons, the Russians appear to have stumbled from one crisis to another. They feared another power controlling the Bosporus Straits, through which the majority of their exports flowed, but never framed a coherent way to address the issue. They felt they owed the Slavs in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires their support and leadership, but there never was a strategic reason to look after the 'little brothers' other than pride or some sense of ethnic and religious solidarity. The tensions within the AHE between the German and Slavs led to endless tension and crises during the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the First and Second Balkan Wars. It has always struck me that the era's belief that war was a logical tool in a country's foreign policy arsenal was delusional. That an Empire recently defeated in Asia, with an antiquated military, extensive social unrest, and financial weakness would continue to play the game, is tragic.
As the Austrians had previously concluded that they must defeat the Serbs in order to maintain the Empire and its prestige, Sarajevo provided the catalyst. "Germany's agreement on July 5 and 6 to Austrian action against Serbia was the single most decisive moment in Europe's descent into war." Fearing a loss of prestige and influence in the Balkans, the Russians supported Serbia and allowed themselves to slip into war. The author does not care to join any of the recent revisionist sleepwalking theories and lays the blame for the beginning of the war on German support for Austria-Hungary.
Only thirty pages of this book address the period after August, 1914. Lieven believes that Germany could easily have won the war if it had attacked Russia first. He also states that Hindenburg and Ludendorff made a massive mistake by provoking the US, and essentially lost the war by unleashing unrestricted submarine warfare. Even then, the eastern front handed them an opportunity at Brest-Litovsk to possibly win the war, which the author believes would have happened had they accepted a draw in the west. His last point is that by excluding the two most powerful nations on the continent, Germany and Russia, from Versailles, Europe was made less stable than before the war. This book provides some different and useful insights. The professional historians who reviewed this book liked it, but do point out that the diplomatic chapters are heavy lifting.
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