Populism began as an American political movement in the last quarter of the 19th century when disgruntled farmers in the south and west decided to try and fight the monopoly of the railroads. It was co-opted by both the major parties* and faded from the scene by the election of 1896. One definition of populism is the people, as a noble assemblage, aligned against self-serving elites. The author prefers to make a distinction between populism of the left and right wing varieties. Left wing populists are vertical. It is the lower and middles class against the establishment. Right wing populists champion the people against the elites whom they accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for example, of immigrants or blacks. Fluidity describes who constitutes the people and the establishment elites at different times and places. Populism usually arises at times of great societal stress and political change. In Europe, populist parties tend to survive on the fringe in the multi-party systems that are part and parcel of European democracy. In the US, they tend to be absorbed by the two major parties or shunted to the side while the parties focus on the center.
The farmer-led movements in the south and west called for a progressive income tax, a nationalization of the railroads, direct election of senators, crop storage financed by the Treasury and an easing of the money supply. In 1892, the People's Party presidential candidate carried five states and in 1894 four congressmen and two senators from the party were elected. They were soon co-opted by William Jennings Bryan's 'Cross of Gold' speech, which led to his first of three Democratic nominations. Similarly, three decades later, Huey Long's ideas on Share The Wealth generated a huge following that thought his confiscatory tax concepts were what was necessary to end the suffering of the people in the Depression. FDR feared that if Long ran as a third-party candidate, he could tip the election to the Republicans. He quickly passed tax reform, the Social Security Act and adopted a pugnacious populist stance. Forty years later, George Wallace began the process that led to Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump. Wallace took the stage as a segregationist, but gained massive traction by selling his frustration as tyranny imposed from Washington. His supporters have been analyzed and categorized as 'middle American radicals' who were neither left nor right, but felt that the middle class was being neglected because the government favored the rich and the poor at their expense.
In our recent campaign, Trump combined moderate Republicanism with anti-establishment views on foreign policy, trade and immigration. He asked why we were paying for the defense of rich countries, challenged all of our trade agreements as being one-sided and vehemently demonized America's immigrant and Muslim communities. In all regards, he was completely opposed by the Republican and Democratic establishments, but enthralling to those stuck in the middle. Trump successfully tapped into the Nixon-Wallace-Perot-Buchanan base of angry, not-well-educated, whites who felt that the elites were favoring the blacks, Muslims, Mexicans, and those outsourcing America's jobs to foreigners. For the life-long progressive, Sanders, the decision to run was based on a concern for growing income inequality. His call for free college and Medicare for all was not aimed against any third parties - only the billionaire class. Both men were propelled to the forefront because of disillusionment created by the Great Recession.
Whether left wing, rightist, European or American, populists raise complaints that point to genuine problems. Globalization in the 90's and 00's led to the export of almost 3 million jobs by American corporations. Immigrants willing to accept lower wages threaten working class natives here and throughout Europe. They also put pressure on social welfare systems. The ghettoization of Muslims in France is a source of political extremism and terrorism. The author's estimate is that neither the Trump nor Sanders movements will be permanent. The Democrats may shift to the left; the Republicans will have to manage the conflicts between their business supporters and their new white working class enthusiasts. But, Judis suggests that the current understandings between the left and right, rich and poor, labor and management will survive and our country will be little changed. He believes the prognosis for the Eurozone is negative. The inherent instability of the EU, when combined with the massive immigration to the continent from Africa and Asia, may well doom the experiment.
This book is but 150 pages. Even so, I skipped the 3 chapters on Europe because I acquired this because of a need to better understand our election results. And it helps on that front. The left/right wing distinction has been helpful to me and the lesson on parties absorbing their aggressive wings has also been instructive.
*I have always thought that the words attributed by Herbert Hoover to Andrew Mellon, "to liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmer, liquidate real estate..it will pare rottenness out of the system", if true, were the height of aristocratic arrogance. But, you have to give consideration to comments made by Grover Cleveland's Secretary of Agriculture, Julius Morton. In 1893, he said, "The intelligent, practical, and successful farmer needs no aid from the government. The ignorant, impractical, and indolent farmer deserves none." And, he was a Democrat.
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