"It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." Thus wrote Thucydides about the Peloponnesian War 2500 years ago. The author's project at Harvard's Kennedy School identified sixteen examples of a power rising to challenge the established order and a dozen of them ended in war. Thus, this is a book about the impact of a rising China on the US and the global order and how to avoid the trap. It was the prime issue in a conversation that Obama and Xi had in Palm Springs, CA in 2015.
At some stage in the last few years, China surpassed the US economically. We are in second place after 150 years of being number one. China is close to catching us militarily in Asia and more importantly, wields and will continue to wield extraordinary economic power. We have declined to participate in the TPP, while their One Belt One Road projects throughout Eurasia are already twelve times the size of the Marshall Plan.
The author explores the rivalries between Athens/Sparta, Hapsburg Empire/France, Holland/England, Germany/France, and Japan/US. The common themes are entitlement, decline, fear, hubris and honor—all leading to war. He then turns to the granddaddy of them all: Germany/Britain. The UK's ministers were most concerned about Germany's 'capabilities' for it was not Wilhelm's occasional bellicosity, but rather the military's potential that caused fear for the well-being of the Empire. And it was not the German army or growing economy that frightened Great Britain, but its Navy. A challenge to the supremacy of the Royal Navy was a threat aimed at the heart of Great Britain. Germany had overtaken Britain economically in a mere generation; it had happened literally overnight. Both sides knew there were risks but neither was able to avoid the conflict. I will interject here though, that it was a time when total war was still considered a viable option as part of a nation's foreign policy agenda.
He then turns to America's rise 120 years ago and writes at length at what can only be called warmongering by TR. In bit more than a decade, we constructed twenty-five battleships, and Teddy steamed them around the world. Concluding that there was no point in fighting us, the British Foreign Office decided that 'accommodation' made the most strategic sense.
Under Xi, China today wants "to be rich, to be powerful and to be respected." The Chinese view their past as thousands of years of success, followed by a century of western-and Japanese-imposed humiliation. The CCP was able to evict the foreigners and end the subjugation. For the last thirty-five years, the Party has propelled China to its place of economic preeminence. And in that place atop the pyramid, they take the position that Asia is to be managed by Asians, and that America's role must recede. China's military focus on denying access to their coast has already made it problematical for the US Navy to operate within a thousand miles of it. Many believe that in a conventional war, China could 'fight and win'.
Our cultural differences are massive. We are Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman and clearly Western; they are Confucian. We view government as a necessary evil; they view it as a necessity. We cherish the individual; they, the collective. We believe in propagating democracy; they deeply resent our endless preaching. We treasure the diversity of our people; they are almost all Han Chinese. Our time horizon is the next quarter; theirs is a century. The American focus on a 'rule-based order' is offensive because the Chinese had no say in making the rules. And, they view Obama's 'pivot' as a direct threat to their security because it implies we will not respect or accept their worldview.
Red China has twice attacked a superior force. In 1950, Mao attacked the US in Korea when MacArthur approached the Yalu River. In 1969, he escalated tensions and attacked the Soviets during a border dispute on the Amur River. The author sees them willing to do so again in their expansive definition of the South China Sea, over the Korean peninsula, over a Taiwanese move to independence and over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Those are just the obvious possibilities.
Turning to the cases where the trap did not lead to war, the author analyzes four, but it is the Cold War example that resonates because Mutually Assured Destruction ruled out war, and likely should again. Add to that what some call Mutually Assured Economic Destruction because of our close ties to China, increases the hope of a peaceful resolution.
However, "[t]here is no 'solution' for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.4 billion people." Lee Kuan Yew, the late leader of Singapore, pointed out that China "will insist on being China, not an honorary member of the west." Accommodation, which is what the UK did 120 years ago when we bullied our way onto the world scene, is not appeasement and could include reducing our support for Taiwan in exchange for concessions elsewhere. Xi offered Obama an understanding at Palm Springs and he declined. Some form of detente for a generation or two could also be negotiated. Perhaps we could coordinate to combat nuclear proliferation, terrorism or climate change together. Allison's closing thought is that we need to decide what is really important to us in the western Pacific. Do we really want to go to war over Taiwan or the atolls the Chinese are building on? We need to understand China and come to grips that they are likely to be much stronger than we will be. There is no assurance that their economy will continue to grow in a straight line, but it has for quite some time. We need a long-term plan, something analogous to containment and not ad-hoc knee-jerk responses with an eye on the news cycle. Both countries should repair matters at home because neither dysfunctional 'decadent democracy' nor 'responsive authoritarianism' suppressing human nature is fit to manage the future's challenges. The author closes with Shakespeare: our destiny "lies not in our stars, but in ourselves." I believe this is a must-read and a great book. It is brief, well-written, thoughtful about the past and insightful about the future.
At some stage in the last few years, China surpassed the US economically. We are in second place after 150 years of being number one. China is close to catching us militarily in Asia and more importantly, wields and will continue to wield extraordinary economic power. We have declined to participate in the TPP, while their One Belt One Road projects throughout Eurasia are already twelve times the size of the Marshall Plan.
The author explores the rivalries between Athens/Sparta, Hapsburg Empire/France, Holland/England, Germany/France, and Japan/US. The common themes are entitlement, decline, fear, hubris and honor—all leading to war. He then turns to the granddaddy of them all: Germany/Britain. The UK's ministers were most concerned about Germany's 'capabilities' for it was not Wilhelm's occasional bellicosity, but rather the military's potential that caused fear for the well-being of the Empire. And it was not the German army or growing economy that frightened Great Britain, but its Navy. A challenge to the supremacy of the Royal Navy was a threat aimed at the heart of Great Britain. Germany had overtaken Britain economically in a mere generation; it had happened literally overnight. Both sides knew there were risks but neither was able to avoid the conflict. I will interject here though, that it was a time when total war was still considered a viable option as part of a nation's foreign policy agenda.
He then turns to America's rise 120 years ago and writes at length at what can only be called warmongering by TR. In bit more than a decade, we constructed twenty-five battleships, and Teddy steamed them around the world. Concluding that there was no point in fighting us, the British Foreign Office decided that 'accommodation' made the most strategic sense.
Under Xi, China today wants "to be rich, to be powerful and to be respected." The Chinese view their past as thousands of years of success, followed by a century of western-and Japanese-imposed humiliation. The CCP was able to evict the foreigners and end the subjugation. For the last thirty-five years, the Party has propelled China to its place of economic preeminence. And in that place atop the pyramid, they take the position that Asia is to be managed by Asians, and that America's role must recede. China's military focus on denying access to their coast has already made it problematical for the US Navy to operate within a thousand miles of it. Many believe that in a conventional war, China could 'fight and win'.
Our cultural differences are massive. We are Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman and clearly Western; they are Confucian. We view government as a necessary evil; they view it as a necessity. We cherish the individual; they, the collective. We believe in propagating democracy; they deeply resent our endless preaching. We treasure the diversity of our people; they are almost all Han Chinese. Our time horizon is the next quarter; theirs is a century. The American focus on a 'rule-based order' is offensive because the Chinese had no say in making the rules. And, they view Obama's 'pivot' as a direct threat to their security because it implies we will not respect or accept their worldview.
Red China has twice attacked a superior force. In 1950, Mao attacked the US in Korea when MacArthur approached the Yalu River. In 1969, he escalated tensions and attacked the Soviets during a border dispute on the Amur River. The author sees them willing to do so again in their expansive definition of the South China Sea, over the Korean peninsula, over a Taiwanese move to independence and over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Those are just the obvious possibilities.
Turning to the cases where the trap did not lead to war, the author analyzes four, but it is the Cold War example that resonates because Mutually Assured Destruction ruled out war, and likely should again. Add to that what some call Mutually Assured Economic Destruction because of our close ties to China, increases the hope of a peaceful resolution.
However, "[t]here is no 'solution' for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.4 billion people." Lee Kuan Yew, the late leader of Singapore, pointed out that China "will insist on being China, not an honorary member of the west." Accommodation, which is what the UK did 120 years ago when we bullied our way onto the world scene, is not appeasement and could include reducing our support for Taiwan in exchange for concessions elsewhere. Xi offered Obama an understanding at Palm Springs and he declined. Some form of detente for a generation or two could also be negotiated. Perhaps we could coordinate to combat nuclear proliferation, terrorism or climate change together. Allison's closing thought is that we need to decide what is really important to us in the western Pacific. Do we really want to go to war over Taiwan or the atolls the Chinese are building on? We need to understand China and come to grips that they are likely to be much stronger than we will be. There is no assurance that their economy will continue to grow in a straight line, but it has for quite some time. We need a long-term plan, something analogous to containment and not ad-hoc knee-jerk responses with an eye on the news cycle. Both countries should repair matters at home because neither dysfunctional 'decadent democracy' nor 'responsive authoritarianism' suppressing human nature is fit to manage the future's challenges. The author closes with Shakespeare: our destiny "lies not in our stars, but in ourselves." I believe this is a must-read and a great book. It is brief, well-written, thoughtful about the past and insightful about the future.
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