This excellent book is a Pulitzer winner from 2005. The title stems from the nature of the war in Afghanistan, where the Soviet conscripts called their opponents 'dukhi' or ghosts. The enemy in the high mountains was a fleeting and lethal apparition.
The year 1979 saw the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the deposing of the Shah, the assaults on the US embassies in Tehran and Islamabad, the attack on Mecca's Grand Mosque and an anti-communist revolt in Afghanistan. The Soviet trained and supplied regime had been in place only a year and seemed incapable of dealing with the changes sweeping the Islamic world. The Soviets invaded in the waning days of the year. The US response was to support the rebels through Pakistan and make the Soviet occupation as painful as possible. The CIA would supply "mules, money and mortars". The Saudis quickly joined in and began delivering endless amounts of cash to Pakistan to support the fight in Afghanistan. Saudi individuals ready to take up arms soon followed. One wealthy young Saudi who travelled between the peninsula and Pakistan and tirelessly worked for the jihadists fighting the infidel Soviets was named Osama Bin Laden. The US and Saudi funded mujahedin effectively bled the Soviets dry in Afghanistan. It was one of the most successful and effective guerrilla wars in history.
The most capable Afghan rebel was Ahmed Massoud, son of an army general, Islamic student of the great resistance fighters and anti-Soviet genius. He led thousands of fighters in the north of the country and stole almost all of his supplies from the Soviets, who threw their best equipped Spetsnaz units against him to no avail. In the US, Bill Casey initiated a massive escalation of the CIA efforts in 1985. In addition to increasing the supplies of money and arms, the US supported a Pakistani guerrilla warfare (if not terrorism) training center that taught combat skills to thousands of not just Afghans, but mujahedin from all over the Middle East. Money poured in and roads were built along the border to assist the delivery of endless material. The Soviets' success in the mid-80's was met by Stinger missiles that turned the tide and the Politburo in the USSR began to consider withdrawal. The confluence of so many jihadists in the area led to discussions about the future nature of their ambitions, as it was not just the communists, but the Americans and Israelis that they despised. In 1989, the Soviets left behind their ten-year equivalent of Vietnam. They had killed two million Afghanis, destroyed whatever bit of a nation there was, had lost 15,000 of their own men, suffered another 35,000 wounded and had failed in their mission to prop up the local regime.
The Soviets left behind a regime headed by Mohammad Najibullah that everyone expected to fail, and the question in Washington and Pakistan was what would come next. The US wished to see Afghani self-determination and our ally wanted an Islamic regime on their northern border. Thus began a variance in policy between the US and Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI). Concurrently, the Saudis lost influence with the mujahedin for their failure to pursue aggressive Islamism in the country. The alliance that had defeated the Soviets was falling apart. With the death of the USSR, Washington ended all financial aid to the country and left it to the Afghanis to sort things out. Kabul fell to Ahmed Massoud in 1992. In a country that had more weapons per capita than any in the world and was selling vast amounts of opium, the US would go almost a decade without a policy or a presence. Afghanistan quickly devolved into internecine tribal fighting. Concurrent with Afghanistan's chaos, the early-90's also saw the rise of aggressive Islamic extremism that culminated in the Taliban's rise to power in Kandahar in 1994. The Pashtuns in the southern part of the country fell under the leadership of Mullah Omar. The Taliban offered a return of the king and an end to the cycles of violence. The rise of the Taliban was supported by both the ISI and Saudi Intelligence. With a financial assist from the new Afghanistan resident, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban occupied Kabul in late 1996 and effectively took over control of the country. The same year saw bin Laden fax his declaration of jihad against America, Israel and Saudi Arabia to a London newspaper. Two years later, he issued a fatwa in conjunction with Ayman al-Zawahiri calling for assaults on American civilians anywhere in the world. By this time, the US was actively trying to hunt down bin Laden.
Al Qaeda and Bin Laden struck for the first time against two US embassies in Africa on August 7, 1998, when truck bombs were detonated causing significant American and African casualties. Capturing Bin Laden became an American objective, yet one that was never successful. There were multiple reasons for the failure. Satellite imaging technology in the late 90's was not what it would become a decade later. In Washington, there were a handful of entities tasked with the pursuit, but none had the funding or manpower necessary for the task. There were also endless legalities that the White House and CIA faced regarding fighting terrorists. Additionally, Bin Laden practiced exquisite evasive tradecraft. He was constantly on the move, did not use telephones and only trusted Arab bodyguards. There were no Afghanis close to him who could be bought. And perhaps most importantly, the Pakistanis lied continually and were of absolutely no help in ascertaining his whereabouts. On top of all this, the author pounds home one consistent theme - in the turmoil of the Clinton White House, there was no policy on Afghanistan or Al Qaeda. That is not to say they weren't very concerned, they just never figured out how to go after him. Bin Laden struck a second time on Oct. 12, 2000 when a small skiff blew a hole in the USS Cole while it was docked in Yemen. The US response would now be in the hands of a new administration.
The outgoing Clinton team told the newcomers that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were existential threats and the most important national security issue they would face. It didn't register with Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld or Rice. By the spring of 2001, the new administration realized that they needed to go after Al Qaeda, but ran into the same strategic hurdle that Clinton had. Pakistan, with its eye on India, had to have an Islamist neighbor to the north. For the US, keeping the two nuclear-armed south Asian countries at peace and the Pakistan nuclear arsenal safe from radicals always trumped the Bin Laden issue. Around and around the conversation went. By the summer, everyone in American counter-intelligence knew something big was about to happen. On Sept. 4th, the administration initiated a plan that would pursue bin Laden in conjunction with an alliance with Ahmed Massoud, who led the only viable anti-Taliban efforts in Afghanistan from its northern regions. They also concluded that the CIA should prepare to fly armed Predator drones in pursuit of Bin Laden. On Sept. 9th, a Taliban suicide bomber killed Massoud.
This is a superb book. But 584 pages of text and mind-numbing detail on every conceivable issue and individual turned this into a 2 week slog for me. This is only for those with ample time and unlimited patience. The sequel 'Directorate S' has just been published and will be tackled in due course.
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