Into The Raging Sea: Thirty-Three Mariners, One Megastorm, And The Sinking of El Faro, Slade - B

                                                      On the evening of September 29, 2015, the forty-year old cargo ship, El Faro, sailed from Jacksonville with a crew of 33.  On the first of October, the US government's hydrophones heard an enormous thud as the ship hit the bottom three miles down. Hurricane Joaquin sank the ship just off the Bahamas as it was on the way to Puerto Rico. The National Hurricane Center had had a difficult time predicting the path of what had been Tropical Depression 11, as it was "weak, meandering and dispersed." Nonetheless, it was a full-fledged hurricane on the 30th and the captain of the ship felt he could steer a course to within 65 miles of the eye. The NHC stumbled tracking the storm and the information making it to El Faro's antiquated printer was hours old or just inaccurate. The private tracking system that the company used was often as much as nine hours late and it relied on the information reported by the government's agencies.  Heading right at the storm continued to be the captain's game plan. The ship was antiquated, the crew inexperienced and unhappy, and most importantly, the captain wasn't very good. He feared for his job in a company that was poorly managed and cutting costs and people left and right. He felt he had to get to Puerto Rico on time and only reluctantly made a modest course adjustment on the evening of the 30th. The captain  ignored the crew's reports and plowed ahead into what he called a low. Just before dawn, the ship listed because it had taken on water and it lost propulsion when the propeller lubrication system failed.  Cargo smashing into the hull caused a significant breach and  flooding. At 7:13 AM, the El Faro activated it's satellite alarm. Approximately twenty minutes later, she went down.
                                                      The search and rescue operation was hindered by the storm, and on day three, Coast Guard pilots saw two debris fields in the water. The El Faro was lost and a full scale Coast Guard and NTSB investigation ensued. US flag carriers of the size of El Faro do not sail into hurricanes and sink. It was the largest loss of life on a US ship since WWII. The voice data recorder (black box) was needed. The ship itself was found on Oct. 31.  At the hearings held at that time, the ship's owner, Tote, adamantly insisted on the correctness of all their maritime procedures, inspections, and personnel policies. In August of 2016, the NTSB recovered  the recorder and which contained the final 26 hours of the El Faro. The final report placed the lion's share of the blame on Captain Davidson. The ship's outdated design that was pushed beyond it's capabilities and Tote's management failures contributed. It certainly appears as if the owners and mangers of the ship allowed a man with limited skills and unlimited hubris to drive 33 people to Davy Jones' locker.