The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War, Kaplan - B

        This book addresses the issues of what propelled the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, and how the arms race has persisted for seven plus decades. In the aftermath of WWII, Truman curtailed the military's control over weapons of mass destruction. The Air Force was required to obtain approval from the Atomic Energy Commission to even put a bomb on a plane. Soon the Cold War altered that dynamic. The Eisenhower administration concluded that the most efficient and least expensive form of containment against the USSR was massive nuclear attack. Once the concept of assuring the enemy's destruction was established, the Navy and Air Force drove policy by competing for funds by promulgating conflicting theories of waging war. The USAF sponsored the growth of strategic bombers and ICBM's, while the Navy espoused submarines armed with nuclear missiles. Jack Kennedy had campaigned on a promise to close the missile gap, but upon taking office learned that the Soviets had four ICBM's and the Air Force had a request in for 2300. The crises in Berlin and Cuba led McNamara and Taylor to back plans to increase the arsenal, while JFK pursued a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the USSR. Kennedy had concluded that the Pentagon's thinking was hopelessly militaristic and unrealistic. Nonetheless, both sides spent the 1960's and '70's increasing their arsenals.  By the time Carter came to office, we and the Soviets had about 1200 ICBM's. Carter tried to slow down the escalation and signed SALT II with Brezhnev, but failed to alter the numbers. When he left office, SAC had 11,000 warheads and there were 7,000 tactical nukes in Western Europe. The Reagan administration ratcheted up the pressure on the USSR with increased weapon deployments and consideration of SDI, called Star Wars by all. Although SDI had no basis in fact or science, it concerned the Soviets. The introduction of Gorbachev to the scene led to meaningful reductions in intermediate range missiles on both sides. It was a first for the Cold War. Planners in the Bush administration were calculating a major reduction in the number of strategic devices when the end of the Cold War afforded them the opportunity to dramatically cut back. However, a potential further reduction bolstered by a treaty with Russia fell apart because the Russians wanted SDI eliminated and the US refused. In the 1990's, the US joined with Russia in securing and dismantling nuclear weapons in former states of the USSR.  The Obama administration negotiated an extension of START in 2010, but needed to agree to additional weapons funding in order to obtain Senate approval. Obama set up the deal with Iran and had hoped to accomplish more with Russia, but ran out of time and up against Putin's intransigence. Under Trump, the US pulled out of the Iran deal and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia,  and did not begin to renegotiate the expiring START. The bomb remains with us.

         This is an interesting read, but one that flagged after the Cold War ended. Nonetheless, whether it was the 1950's or today, the buzzwords of the nuclear strategists* remind us that lunacy and delusion are at the center of it all.

*finite deterrence, mutually assured destruction, 1st strike, 2nd strike, damage limiting, selective attack options, controlled response, spasm reactions, limited nuclear options, escalation spectrum, escalation ladder, throw-weight, megatonnage, etc.