The author, a highly regarded NYU professor and Bancroft Prize winner, contends that Henry Kissinger's tenure in government marks a turning point in American foreign policy. In the opening quarter-century of the Cold War, the foreign policy establishment, that we associate with an endless cast of Ivy League patricians, operated with a sense of decorum and an easily understandable American value system. In the 60's Kissinger wrote: "There are two kinds of realists: those who manipulate facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality." From the violation of Cambodia's neutrality to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, those who created their own reality have kept America in a constant state of war.
Kissinger was opposed to both containment and mutually assured destruction as the pillars of our policy versus the USSR. He felt containment limited us to the spot or place where the Soviets needed to be contained and MAD limited our ability to respond at a different level. And although he felt we could not win in Vietnam, he approved the fact that we were projecting power for power's sake. A response to the threat of communism was warranted. The author says that he believed the means justified the end. The US simply had to be powerful, had to do something. Kissinger was catapulted from theorist to power in late 1968/early 1969 when he transitioned from professor to the strongest National Security Advisor in history. Within a month of taking office, Nixon and Kissinger began the secret bombing of Cambodia in order to send a message to North Vietnam. The bombing neither effected the Paris negotiations nor interdicted the flow of supplies south, and a year later, the US sent ground troops into Cambodia, exploding tensions at home - "Tin soldiers and Nixon coming........Four dead in Ohio". Nonetheless, the bombings continued until 1972 and more bombs were dropped on Laos and Cambodia than on Germany and Japan. "By executing Nixon's war strategy with such zeal, he quickened the break up" of America's Cold War consensus, where "the White House and the foreign policy establishment operated with nearly unquestioned autonomy." In the opinion of many observers, Nixon and Kissinger achieved terms in 1972 that were available in 1969 and had extended the war primarily to appear strong and assure Nixon's re-election. In the post-Vietnam era, "Kissinger felt that public displays of resolve would help America restore its damaged credibility and legitimacy". Kissinger wanted to "go big" but the opportunity did not arise. Hr relied on covert CIA activities around the world to effectuate policy. "This coupling of secrecy and spectacle would evolve over the years, finding innovative expression during the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations."
The last decades of the 20th century saw Kissinger's philosophy used to establish a near permanent state of war. "From Central America to Grenada, Panama to the First Gulf War and beyond, one can plot the crescendo, the way each military action represented a bit more - more commitment, more confidence regained, more troops deployed, more spectacular displays of fire power, more lives lost." He ardently and vigorously encouraged the invasion of Iraq after 9/11. He has supported Obama's significant expansion of drone strikes throughout the world. "And after Kissinger himself is gone, one imagines Kissingerism will endure as well."
As a twenty-year old college junior, I felt that Nixon and Kissinger were plotting to destroy me and my friends. I've loathed them for for over forty-five years and after reading this book, still do. The author is clearly of a similar mind, but I believe stretches at times and fails to connect all of his dots. Not every evil perpetuated in the defense of freedom can be traced to Kissinger. It is important to note that the NYTimes reviewer ( a University of Texas professor) feels the same way. "Did later leaders really require Kissinger's precedent to wage secret wars, violate foreign nations' sovereignty and prioritize grand displays of power?" Grandin ignores Kissinger's success with China, in establishing detente with the Soviets and signing the SALT treaty. To castigate him for his successful post-government financial success seems a bit churlish. For anyone who has been paying attention for the last four or so decades, this is a very good read.
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