This book is the first in what looks to be a very promising trilogy. Toll's presentation of history prior to Pearl Harbor begins with Japan's victory over the Russians at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 and the subsequent enhanced strategic role played by the navy in Japan. The Japanese became convinced that the West, the US and Britain in particular, treated them as an inferior race and with disrespect. The Versailles Treaty, the 50-50-30 limitations of the naval disarmament agreements, and the US 1924 law prohibiting Japanese immigration fueled the fire that led to increasingly nationalist policies in Japan. The militarists took over the government and by the early thirties, had set the nation on the course to war. Ridding Asia of the two English-speaking hegemons was the objective. Manchuria and China were invaded and Japan left the League of Nations. While the army caused as many as 10 million civilian casualties in China, the navy prepared to launch a war in the Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto is portrayed very favorably. He was opposed to war and did not think that the US could be defeated. Even though there were those in the navy hierarchy who pushed the ongoing building of battleships, including two behemoths 50% larger than ours, he realized that submarines and carrier-based planes were the weapons of the future. He had extracted from his superiors an assurance that his audacious plan for Pearl Harbor would never be called a sneak attack. There was supposed to be a Japanese declaration of war prior to the initiation of hostilities. Meanwhile, in the decades leading up to 1941, the US Navy war-gaming analytics and strategic planning involved one enemy and one enemy only - the naval forces of the Empire of Japan. In essence, both navies were ready for each other, but the Japanese were better trained and prepared.
The US response to Pearl Harbor was a declaration of war and much anxiety. A very brave resistance on Wake Island was the high point of the month of December. The year ended with Nimitz arriving in Pearl Harbor with a directive to win the war. Ironically, Pearl Harbor had eliminated the US's anti-war movement and assured America would rally around the flag and crush the Japanese. Also, Japan's success at Pearl, and two days later off Singapore when they sent two British capital ships to the bottom, signaled the ascent of the carrier and the end of the battleship era. This was apparent to the Americans, but not the Japanese, who believed in the battleship almost to the end.
The US had available only four carriers - Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown and Lexington - to start offensive operations. In January, Halsey led a successful two-ship raid on the Marshall's. But the Japanese tide could not be thwarted. By the end of the first quarter of 1942, they were as far west as Rangoon, Burma and were threatening India. In the southeast, they had conquered Java and Borneo and were on the way to Australia. They had succeeded so quickly that they literally did not know where to turn next. Doolittle's April raid was a shock, but of no real strategic import. Central planning in Tokyo thought that severing the sea lanes between the US and Australia was the opportune choice. Yamamoto wanted to attack Midway and draw the US fleet out for destruction. The Japanese decision was to strike first in the Coral Sea between New Guinea and Australia and then at Midway. Although overmatched and outnumbered at every turn, the US had a better intelligence system, and the analysts at Pearl called the Japanese moves. Later historians have concluded that the local cryptographer, Cmdr. Rochefort, was one of the most important men in the war. The early May Battle of the Coral Sea saw the US stop the intended landing at Port Moresby, New Guinea, but at the cost of the loss of the Lexington. The first week of June saw the incomparably brave and fortuitous turn of events to the northwest of the Midway atoll. We managed to sink four carriers, the Akagi, Soryu, Kaga, and Hiryu, losing only the Yorktown. For all intents and purposes, the Japanese expansion in the Pacific was over. It would now become a war of attrition in which Japan hoped that their intensity and devotion to their Emperor would overcome the industrial might of the democratic opponent.
The US response to Pearl Harbor was a declaration of war and much anxiety. A very brave resistance on Wake Island was the high point of the month of December. The year ended with Nimitz arriving in Pearl Harbor with a directive to win the war. Ironically, Pearl Harbor had eliminated the US's anti-war movement and assured America would rally around the flag and crush the Japanese. Also, Japan's success at Pearl, and two days later off Singapore when they sent two British capital ships to the bottom, signaled the ascent of the carrier and the end of the battleship era. This was apparent to the Americans, but not the Japanese, who believed in the battleship almost to the end.
The US had available only four carriers - Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown and Lexington - to start offensive operations. In January, Halsey led a successful two-ship raid on the Marshall's. But the Japanese tide could not be thwarted. By the end of the first quarter of 1942, they were as far west as Rangoon, Burma and were threatening India. In the southeast, they had conquered Java and Borneo and were on the way to Australia. They had succeeded so quickly that they literally did not know where to turn next. Doolittle's April raid was a shock, but of no real strategic import. Central planning in Tokyo thought that severing the sea lanes between the US and Australia was the opportune choice. Yamamoto wanted to attack Midway and draw the US fleet out for destruction. The Japanese decision was to strike first in the Coral Sea between New Guinea and Australia and then at Midway. Although overmatched and outnumbered at every turn, the US had a better intelligence system, and the analysts at Pearl called the Japanese moves. Later historians have concluded that the local cryptographer, Cmdr. Rochefort, was one of the most important men in the war. The early May Battle of the Coral Sea saw the US stop the intended landing at Port Moresby, New Guinea, but at the cost of the loss of the Lexington. The first week of June saw the incomparably brave and fortuitous turn of events to the northwest of the Midway atoll. We managed to sink four carriers, the Akagi, Soryu, Kaga, and Hiryu, losing only the Yorktown. For all intents and purposes, the Japanese expansion in the Pacific was over. It would now become a war of attrition in which Japan hoped that their intensity and devotion to their Emperor would overcome the industrial might of the democratic opponent.
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