Challenger: A True Story of Heroism and Disaster on the Edge of Space, Higginbotham - A*

                As the Apollo program was winding down, NASA turned its thoughts to a vehicle that could leave the earth and return in- tact. "This would require a true spacefaring vessel, and such a vehicle remained the stuff of science fiction." A plane that could withstand the forces of liftoff, survive the "cold soak" of space,  reenter the atmosphere at 2700 degrees Fahrenheit and have  engines that could work both in the atmosphere and in outer space was seemingly impossible. Nonetheless, a plane was designed by NASA and began production at four different contractors.  NASA selected thirty-five new astronauts for the program and dropped the prior requirement that each candidate have extensive flying experience. TFNG's (the thirty-five new guys) included men of color and women for the first time. Columbia took its maiden flight on April 12, 1981 with two NASA veterans, John Young and Bob Crippen, at the controls. It exceeded all expectations and an exultant nation reveled in its success. 

              When the solid fuel rockets were recovered from the Atlantic, engineers were surprised to see that the O rings were charred after a two minute ignition. The massive 150 foot rockets weighed over a million tons and had to be manufactured in four parts before final assembly at Cape Canaveral. The O rings were part of the mechanism that sealed the parts together. NASA and the contractors' engineers believed they had solved the issue after the maiden flight, and there were no problems on ensuing shuttle liftoffs.  However in early 1984, Morton Thiokol engineers discovered another O ring erosion in two different places. The professional conclusion a month later was that future erosion was not a threat to the viability of the engine.  In January, 1985 after a once in a century freezing cold in Florida, the O rings failed to compress quickly enough and suffered significant charring. Senior executives at Huntsville and at Thiokol began to believe that sooner or later, there would be a catastrophic failure. 

             Flight STS 51-L scheduled for January, 1986 included two passengers, Christa McAuliffe, a social studies teacher from New Hampshire who would give lessons from space, and Greg Jarvis, an engineer from Hughes Aircraft selected to launch a Hughes satellite. The rest of the crew were NASA veterans; Ron McNair, Judy Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, and Dick Scobee had all flown previously. Only astronaut Mike Smith was a first timer. The crew and thousands of family, friends, and spectators descended on the Cape.  Cold weather scrubbed the launch for Sunday, the 25th, and the 26th. When Thiokol's engineers learned how cold it was, they alerted the Cape to the risks and offered a 14 man unanimous recommendation to not launch. The temperature at launch was forecasted to be 24 degrees colder than any previous launch and the O rings would lose all flexibility, be rigid, and would not hold their seal. NASA vigorously pushed back and the Thiokol men relented. Challenger would launch at 9:38 A.M. on the 28th.

           The early arrivers at the launchpad on Tuesday were shocked by the amount of ice everywhere. Florida was experiencing its second January in a row of a once in a century freeze. The crew entered the shuttle and the door was closed at 9:07.  When the Rockwell exec in California saw the ice, he told Florida that the manufacturer of the spacecraft could not assure the safety of the orbiter. NASA moved forward as another hold would disrupt the launch schedule for the year. As the countdown proceeded, the man at Thiokol in Utah who had pushed the hardest to stop the launch refused to watch on tv. At 11:39, the Challenger lifted off. Seventy-two seconds into the flight, the Challenger exploded.

           Within days, those who studied the film knew it was the O rings, and in Washington, it was decided that there would be a Presidential Commission to investigate the tragedy. Within a week, a Thiokol executive pointed out that the people from NASA were prevaricating about what happened. The commission, chaired by former AG Bill Rogers, concluded that many NASA people were lying and that their decision making process was "clearly flawed." The insistence to fly when the Thiokol people were opposed was the linchpin of their negligence. The final report was "damning." Those at NASA who lied and misled were quietly retired or shunted aside. The whistleblowers who told the truth at Thiokol became personae non gratae. In a famous appendix to the Rogers Report, a noted Caltech scientist said, "For a successful technology, science must take precedence over public relations for nature cannot be fooled." Four families accepted the governments compensation, and three received awards after lengthy litigation. When Columbia failed in 2003, the report concluded that "many lessons of the Challenger disaster had gone unheeded." This very sad story is an indictment of any entity that insists on persevering through dissonant information because of the overriding expectations of accomplishing the mission. A truly great book.