Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945, Murray - B+

                "As with all military thought, a wide variety of political, historical, and economic factors guided the development of air doctrines in the period between the First and Second World Wars." Paramount though in the rush to build air forces was a desire to avoid a repetition of the horror of the first war's trench warfare. That said, what followed was not unlike what had preceded, a battle of attrition. Throughout the 1930's, the materials necessary to build an air force - rubber, aluminum, and petroleum were in short supply in Germany. And because the country was a continental power, the Wehrmacht's needs took priority. Thus, the development of the Luftwaffe was "subject to definite economic constraints," and the requirement to support the other armed forces. Goring was an incapable manager, and the only person attending to "strategic planning, force structure, or industrial production." His inadequacies, combined with the economic limitations above, led to the collapse of the air arm late in the war. 

             The rapid victory over Poland was due to overwhelming power, and the close coordination of air power supporting ground forces. In Norway, the Luftwaffe was critical to Germany's submission of the country. In France, "the use of dive bombers to support the Meuse crossings played a major role in one of the most decisive strategic victories in the military history of the 20th century." However as the Luftwaffe was at the outer limits of the range of its planes, it suffered serious losses over Dunkirk. Although the Battle of Britain was a close run thing, to some extent the result was preordained, as the Germans had no aircraft that could compete with the Spitfire and Hurricane. For Barbarossa, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to destroy the Soviet air force. On the first few days, the Soviets lost 3800 planes. However as the year wore on, maintenance and supply systems reached the breaking point in Germany. By December, the Germans had stalled, indeed they were facing defeat. They had not prepared for the losses they suffered, and production could not keep up with the loss of men and material. For all intents and purposes, defeat was now inevitable. Throughout 1942, the Luftwaffe remained focused in the east, supporting the army as it dealt with the burgeoning Soviet response to the invasion. Only in the Crimea region did the Wehrmacht and its air support achieve offensive success. However by the end of the year, the imbalance of men and material was overwhelmingly in the favor of the Allies, who outproduced Germany's airplane production by a ratio of 2.5 to 1. 

            The air war over Germany began in 1942 when the British initiated their bombing campaign, which escalated significantly the following year. They pounded the Ruhr in March at a "terrible cost" and "flirted" with defeat. Success soon followed with the use of chaff to confound local radar. They destroyed Hamburg that summer. The British nighttime area bombing was supplemented by American daytime strategic precision bombing. When the Americans flew into German airspace and beyond the range of their fighter escorts, the Luftwaffe inflicted immense casualties on the 8th Air Force. Because Hitler was so focused on revenge, he encouraged continued construction of bombers and missiles to attack Britain instead of building more fighters to defend the Reich. That said, when Bomber Command began the arduous task of attacking Berlin, Germany was able to hold them off by coordinating a defense based upon ground radar coordination with searchlights, night fighters with radar, and flak to inflict heavy damage on the British to the point that they called off the attacks. Indeed, in the first quarter of 1944, Bomber Command lost 796 planes and crew. The US introduced the long range American fighter escort, the P-51 Mustang, and changed the dynamics of the air war. Reinforced with a massive infusion of men, fighters and bombers, the objective of the 8th Air Force now became the elimination of the Luftwaffe. During "Big Week" in February 1944, the US began flying 1,000 bombers with as many escorts against the overmatched Germans. Luftwaffe losses became "unmanageable."

             The Allies then turned to preparations for Overlord by bombing French rail and marshalling yards, the rail bridges over the Seine, and German fuel and refinery capabilities. When the invasion came, it was only "the skill and tenacity" of Germany's soldiers that prevented a rout. From D-Day to the end of the month, Allied pilots flew 130,000 sorties, ten times the Luftwaffe's. By the end of the summer, Germany and the Luftwaffe were spent. But the Allies in the west failed to capitalize on the situation and conclude the final victory, assuring eight more months of casualties for both sides and the ongoing destruction of Germany.

             This is a magnificent military history, and one those who have an interest and patience will enjoy.