"Tojo Hideki. His bristling, mustached countenance was, from the moment he led Japan into hostilities in the Pacific, the face of the nation's participation in World War II." In the postwar era, he was remembered as the man who brought war and ruin to Japan. When the Yasukuni Shrine enshrined him in the late 1970s, Hirohito never visited it again. This book is "a military biography of General Tojo," and because his career encompassed all of Japan's 20th-century rise and fall, it tells the story of the country's military and government as well.
He was born in Tokyo in 1884. Hideki entered the Military Preparatory School in 1899. One of the school's core principles was an absolute commitment to the emperor. He entered the Imperial War College in 1912 and graduated at the end of 1915. A deficiency in the curriculum was its focus on the army alone, particularly the infantry. The role of naval and air forces was not considered important, nor was the necessity of coordinating societal support with the government. After a brief staff assignment, Tojo spent three and a half years in Europe as part of a contingent attempting to study and understand Germany's war experience. Their key takeaways were the importance of coordinating with the artillery branch, providing better weapons for smaller infantry units, and working closely with the civilian structures supporting the army—they adopted Germany's concept of total war. Back in Tokyo, he and other like-minded staff members worked toward modernization and implementing a structure capable of managing a nation at war. They believed it was necessary to take Manchuria and Mongolia because the war machine would need their natural resources, and they came to believe that the army should lead the nation once war began.
He was appointed commander of a regiment in Tokyo during a period of army rebelliousness and opposition to the government. He twice opposed army coups and saw his colleagues rise to the top of the army's hierarchy. Although promoted to general, Tojo wound up politically ostracized and fearful of an early retirement. While in limbo, he applauded the empire's aggressive actions in Manchukuo and supported the country's withdrawal from the League of Nations. He believed the U.S. and the U.K. were vehemently anti-Japanese because of the London and Washington Naval Conferences that imposed limits on Japan. Furthermore, Hideki believed the U.S. and the USSR were coordinating an encirclement of the country. He was transferred to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. He opposed the latest coup attempt in Tokyo and worked on industrializing Manchukuo. He wanted to take aggressive action against China and the USSR, and in 1937 led the prosecution of the undeclared war against China, often ignoring advice and orders from Tokyo. His success in China led to a promotion to vice army minister in 1938.
Although I seem to be quitting more books than usual lately, I've decided I cannot go another 300 pages without finding out whether the author ever addresses the incomprehensible thinking of Japan's military elite. They had virtually no perspective outside of samurai warrior traditions. Tunnel vision would be a broader perspective than the way they looked at the world. They fought and argued among themselves like third-grade boys. There was virtually no consideration of diplomacy, and they often simply ignored orders. The author's treatment of the Rape of Nanking in only a paragraph or two was more than I could handle. Tojo was eventually tried, convicted, and hanged as a war criminal.
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