Cont’d. from a September 26 post of Part One
Like Johnson before him, Nixon was focused on Vietnam while the Soviets plotted and planned in the Middle East. The Nixon Doctrine said Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were the pillars of US foreign policy in the region. The Saudis had more oil than anyone, and a military that could only be described as incompetent. The Shah readily agreed to the president's request for help, and in exchange became the principal buyer of Pentagon weapons in the world. The Israelis ignored the State Department's urgings for them to treat their recent conquests as temporary occupations. Armed with the latest Soviet equipment, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in October 1973. As the IDF was totally unprepared, the Arabs were initially successful. However, very quickly, the Israelis rolled back the Arab gains as the US began an airlift larger than the one to Berlin in 1948. The Soviet naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean were on high alert, and the Kremlin was considering sending troops to Egypt and Syria. With the temperature rising and Nixon sidelined by Watergate, Kissinger and Dobrynin arranged a cease-fire. It was over, and in Egypt, Sadat began taking steps that would lead to the Camp David Accords.
Because of Iran's vast oil reserves and long border with the USSR, American presidents considered it a critical ally during the Cold War. The US poured weapons into Iran as the Shah propelled the country into the modern era. But there were substantial undercurrents of opposition, particularly among religious leaders. Throughout the 1970s, the regime became more oppressive and out of touch with society. Its massive corruption and the Shah's over-the-top lifestyle were fodder for the revolutionaries. The US sought stability by relying on a regional strongman whose rule was very unsteady. A longtime State Department-Iraq hand predicted the Shah would "fold" and be "swept away because of his failure of will." The cancer-ridden Shah left Tehran in late 1978, and the Ayatollah arrived in February. The American foreign policy establishment was out of touch and watched as the Ayatollah concentrated power. The Iranians took over the American embassy after Carter let the Shah into the US and established loathing of the "Great Satan" as a national policy. The new Iran severed diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel and began supporting the radicals in the Muslim world. US policies in the Middle East were a shambles.
In April 1978, a Marxist party seized power in Afghanistan. The Sovietization of the country led to a vast "Islamic backlash." The US response was to support a Soviet-style Third World subversion. The Saudis poured billions into the insurgents' hands. The funds created an "endowed terrorism university graduating sixteen to eighteen thousand guerrillas" annually. The Soviets were overwhelmed and began to pull back in the mid-1980s. The Saudi Osama bin Laden was bored in Afghanistan and began to think about bringing jihad to Israel and America.
Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, and the US enthusiastically backed Saddam a few years later. America later surreptitiously sent money and equipment to Iran, then backtracked as the war ended in 1988. Saddam was deeply in debt and very much despised the US. Struggling economically, Saddam decided to make mayhem in the Gulf and, in 1990, invaded Kuwait. The hawks in the Bush administration viewed it as a major crisis and the centrists as a manageable problem. The US was on the horns of a dilemma, and the Saudis refused to ask for help. When it was evident that Saddam intended to invade Saudi Arabia, Riyadh changed its mind. Bush organized an international coalition with the support of the US Congress. The aerial bombardment began, and a 100-hour ground war destroyed Iraq's armed forces, but did not proceed to Baghdad or remove Saddam. Returning Kuwait to its people and rulers still left Saddam as a festering problem for a decade plus. Primarily, it provided motivation to bin Laden. He deplored the fact that US troops were stationed in the country that was home to Mecca. He viewed it as a religious offense. As the US has frequently done, it analyzed issues strategically without considering local religious or political movements. Bin Laden built an extremist ideology that allowed the killing of innocents in direct contradiction to the Koran. He achieved his dreams on September 11, 2001.
America responded by bombing the Taliban, his hosts in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the number of bombs dropped, the US did not break the Taliban or find bin Laden. Rumsfeld dismissed any consideration of ground troops because he was already thinking about invading Iraq. Bin Laden and almost all of his senior lieutenants escaped to Pakistan. The US had completely mishandled its attempt to find bin Laden and decapitated the Afghan government.
A year after September 11, the administration published the Bush Doctrine, stating that the US would topple totalitarian regimes, spread democracy, and preempt terrorist attacks. Iraq, with its 300 million barrels of oil reserves, became the US's prime target. Cheney and his team began to demonize Iraq and Saddam, even though most felt strongly that he had been contained and was no more than a nuisance. Those tasked with selling the war to the public disparaged and dismissed those opposed. If you weren't on board, you were gone, as groupthink prevailed. They believed a Western-friendly democratic Iraq would allow access to its oil and the construction of US bases and thus become a foundation for the US in the Gulf. It was the epitome of wishful thinking in lieu of a plan. Even Israel declared Saddam its only real concern. The Economist said Bush's war cabinet was "medieval inquisitors looking for witches." To make matters worse, Rumsfeld took the position that the US could occupy and govern a country with 25 million people, divided into conflicting religious minorities, with 160,000 men. The army knew it would take almost half of its worldwide strength to accomplish the administration's goals and that the US plan would lead to "chaos." Cheney said we "would be treated like liberators" after a "cakewalk."
Operation Iraqi Freedom was an astounding military success. The US crushed the Iraqis and entered Baghdad in a matter of weeks. "The Saddam regime collapsed like a house of cards." A new government did not sprout up and welcome the Americans with open arms. The US removed all Baathists from government and disbanded the army. Thus, the most capable people in the country were out of work, with "few prospects beyond being paupers, criminals, or insurgents." There was a security vacuum, leading to multiple factions seeking their own narrow ends, and since there were arms everywhere, occupation troops came under fire. Outsiders, such as ISIS, entered the country, and the Kurds fought for their own freedom. The chaotic predictions of those opposed to the war came true. The Coalition Provisional Authority, tasked with putting the country back together, had no strategic plan and was understaffed with inexperienced people. The US turned to counterinsurgency as it now occupied a country in full revolt against it. Bush's final years in office saw him outsource the war to David Petraeus.
"From the Balfour Declaration to the Bush Doctrine, the United States has struggled to find its stride in the Middle East. American strategy has been muddled and confused over the years because it has been addressed politically, not strategically." Every president since Truman has supported Israel, and the Jewish lobby has effectively wielded its power. "Modern European history and the Cold War explain many of America's problems in the Middle East." Policies in Germany sent hundreds of thousands of Jews to Palestine, and Soviet threats to the oil in the Gulf were considered a red line. The US has been faced with an insoluble and intractable conundrum—how to reconcile its politically motivated support for Israel and its, and Europe's, reliance on oil pumped by the cynical, corrupt, and imperious Saudis.
For my money, this is a fabulous book. It is well-written, and it is incredibly detailed. Its premise in opposition to America's aggressive foreign policies resonates with me. Chest-thumping hubris without any local knowledge is foolish and dangerous. After all, Barack Obama said, "Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail."
Cont’d. from a September 26 post of Part One
Like Johnson before him, Nixon was focused on Vietnam while the Soviets plotted and planned in the Middle East. The Nixon Doctrine said Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were the pillars of US foreign policy in the region. The Saudis had more oil than anyone, and a military that could only be described as incompetent. The Shah readily agreed to the president's request for help, and in exchange became the principal buyer of Pentagon weapons in the world. The Israelis ignored the State Department's urgings for them to treat their recent conquests as temporary occupations. Armed with the latest Soviet equipment, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in October 1973. As the IDF was totally unprepared, the Arabs were initially successful. However, very quickly, the Israelis rolled back the Arab gains as the US began an airlift larger than the one to Berlin in 1948. The Soviet naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean were on high alert, and the Kremlin was considering sending troops to Egypt and Syria. With the temperature rising and Nixon sidelined by Watergate, Kissinger and Dobrynin arranged a cease-fire. It was over, and in Egypt, Sadat began taking steps that would lead to the Camp David Accords.
Because of Iran's vast oil reserves and long border with the USSR, American presidents considered it a critical ally during the Cold War. The US poured weapons into Iran as the Shah propelled the country into the modern era. But there were substantial undercurrents of opposition, particularly among religious leaders. Throughout the 1970s, the regime became more oppressive and out of touch with society. Its massive corruption and the Shah's over-the-top lifestyle were fodder for the revolutionaries. The US sought stability by relying on a regional strongman whose rule was very unsteady. A longtime State Department-Iraq hand predicted the Shah would "fold" and be "swept away because of his failure of will." The cancer-ridden Shah left Tehran in late 1978, and the Ayatollah arrived in February. The American foreign policy establishment was out of touch and watched as the Ayatollah concentrated power. The Iranians took over the American embassy after Carter let the Shah into the US and established loathing of the "Great Satan" as a national policy. The new Iran severed diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel and began supporting the radicals in the Muslim world. US policies in the Middle East were a shambles.
In April 1978, a Marxist party seized power in Afghanistan. The Sovietization of the country led to a vast "Islamic backlash." The US response was to support a Soviet-style Third World subversion. The Saudis poured billions into the insurgents' hands. The funds created an "endowed terrorism university graduating sixteen to eighteen thousand guerrillas" annually. The Soviets were overwhelmed and began to pull back in the mid-1980s. The Saudi Osama bin Laden was bored in Afghanistan and began to think about bringing jihad to Israel and America.
Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, and the US enthusiastically backed Saddam a few years later. America later surreptitiously sent money and equipment to Iran, then backtracked as the war ended in 1988. Saddam was deeply in debt and very much despised the US. Struggling economically, Saddam decided to make mayhem in the Gulf and, in 1990, invaded Kuwait. The hawks in the Bush administration viewed it as a major crisis and the centrists as a manageable problem. The US was on the horns of a dilemma, and the Saudis refused to ask for help. When it was evident that Saddam intended to invade Saudi Arabia, Riyadh changed its mind. Bush organized an international coalition with the support of the US Congress. The aerial bombardment began, and a 100-hour ground war destroyed Iraq's armed forces, but did not proceed to Baghdad or remove Saddam. Returning Kuwait to its people and rulers still left Saddam as a festering problem for a decade plus. Primarily, it provided motivation to bin Laden. He deplored the fact that US troops were stationed in the country that was home to Mecca. He viewed it as a religious offense. As the US has frequently done, it analyzed issues strategically without considering local religious or political movements. Bin Laden built an extremist ideology that allowed the killing of innocents in direct contradiction to the Koran. He achieved his dreams on September 11, 2001.
America responded by bombing the Taliban, his hosts in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the number of bombs dropped, the US did not break the Taliban or find bin Laden. Rumsfeld dismissed any consideration of ground troops because he was already thinking about invading Iraq. Bin Laden and almost all of his senior lieutenants escaped to Pakistan. The US had completely mishandled its attempt to find bin Laden and decapitated the Afghan government.
A year after September 11, the administration published the Bush Doctrine, stating that the US would topple totalitarian regimes, spread democracy, and preempt terrorist attacks. Iraq, with its 300 million barrels of oil reserves, became the US's prime target. Cheney and his team began to demonize Iraq and Saddam, even though most felt strongly that he had been contained and was no more than a nuisance. Those tasked with selling the war to the public disparaged and dismissed those opposed. If you weren't on board, you were gone, as groupthink prevailed. They believed a Western-friendly democratic Iraq would allow access to its oil and the construction of US bases and thus become a foundation for the US in the Gulf. It was the epitome of wishful thinking in lieu of a plan. Even Israel declared Saddam its only real concern. The Economist said Bush's war cabinet was "medieval inquisitors looking for witches." To make matters worse, Rumsfeld took the position that the US could occupy and govern a country with 25 million people, divided into conflicting religious minorities, with 160,000 men. The army knew it would take almost half of its worldwide strength to accomplish the administration's goals and that the US plan would lead to "chaos." Cheney said we "would be treated like liberators" after a "cakewalk."
Operation Iraqi Freedom was an astounding military success. The US crushed the Iraqis and entered Baghdad in a matter of weeks. "The Saddam regime collapsed like a house of cards." A new government did not sprout up and welcome the Americans with open arms. The US removed all Baathists from government and disbanded the army. Thus, the most capable people in the country were out of work, with "few prospects beyond being paupers, criminals, or insurgents." There was a security vacuum, leading to multiple factions seeking their own narrow ends, and since there were arms everywhere, occupation troops came under fire. Outsiders, such as ISIS, entered the country, and the Kurds fought for their own freedom. The chaotic predictions of those opposed to the war came true. The Coalition Provisional Authority, tasked with putting the country back together, had no strategic plan and was understaffed with inexperienced people. The US turned to counterinsurgency as it now occupied a country in full revolt against it. Bush's final years in office saw him outsource the war to David Petraeus.
"From the Balfour Declaration to the Bush Doctrine, the United States has struggled to find its stride in the Middle East. American strategy has been muddled and confused over the years because it has been addressed politically, not strategically." Every president since Truman has supported Israel, and the Jewish lobby has effectively wielded its power. "Modern European history and the Cold War explain many of America's problems in the Middle East." Policies in Germany sent hundreds of thousands of Jews to Palestine, and Soviet threats to the oil in the Gulf were considered a red line. The US has been faced with an insoluble and intractable conundrum—how to reconcile its politically motivated support for Israel and its, and Europe's, reliance on oil pumped by the cynical, corrupt, and imperious Saudis.
For my money, this is a fabulous book. It is well-written, and it is incredibly detailed. Its premise in opposition to America's aggressive foreign policies resonates with me. Chest-thumping hubris without any local knowledge is foolish and dangerous. After all, Barack Obama said, "Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail."
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